Corporate Taxation\u27s Square Peg: An Analysis of Possible Solutions to the Problem of Characterizing  Tracking Stock  for Tax Purposes by Borek, Charles A.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 43 
Issue 4 Summer 1994 Article 3 
1994 
Corporate Taxation's Square Peg: An Analysis of Possible 
Solutions to the Problem of Characterizing "Tracking Stock" for 
Tax Purposes 
Charles A. Borek 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Charles A. Borek, Corporate Taxation's Square Peg: An Analysis of Possible Solutions to the Problem of 
Characterizing "Tracking Stock" for Tax Purposes, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1107 (1994). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol43/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
CORPORATE TAXATION'S SQUARE PEG:
AN ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO
THE PROBLEM OF CHARACTERIZING
"TRACKING STOCK" FOR TAX PURPOSES
Charles A. Borek*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Tracking stock"' is a class of corporate equity securities whose value is
designed to track the performance of specific assets or groups of assets of
a corporation.2 As such, tracking stock splits the interest in the corpora-
tion vertically, unlike common and preferred stock, which traditionally
divide the corporate interest horizontally.3 Tracking stock may be issued
for a variety of business purposes, including a desire to maximize stock
trading price or a need for a specialized investment vehicle to facilitate a
corporate acquisition.4 Because this stock is unique in its vertical division
* B.A., Mary Washington College, 1985; M.B.A., University of Baltimore, 1993;
J.D., summa cum laude, University of Baltimore, 1993; Certified Public Accountant, State
of Maryland; Associate, Thomas & Libowitz, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland; Adjunct Profes-
sor of Law, University of Baltimore. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Professor Fred Brown in the preparation of this article.
1. The term "alphabet stock" is often used interchangeably with "tracking stock."
"Alphabet stock" is derived from General Motors' creation of "E" and "H" stock to track
its subsidiaries, Electronic Data Systems Corporation and Hughes Aircraft Company. Jef-
frey T. Sheffield & Barbara M. St. Clair, An Abecedarium on Alphabet Stock, 66 TAXES
954, 954 n.1 (1988). For the sake of simplicity, the term "tracking stock" will be used
exclusively in this article.
2. See id. at 956 (stating that the use of tracking stock to determine the performance
of a certain portion of corporate assets has economic and tax advantages over regular dis-
tribution of stock).
3. See New York State Bar Association Tax Section Corporations Committee and Re-
organizations Committee Report Regarding "Tracking Stock" Arrangements, 43 TAX L.
REV. 51, 53 (1987) [hereinafter Report]. Typically, both common and preferred stock share
the earnings of the entire corporation. Id. Tracking stock arrangements usually provide
that dividends are to be paid out of a segregated portion of total corporate earnings. Id.
The value of the tracking stock is usually designed to reflect the value of the underlying
assets, not a portion of the corporation as a whole. Id. (stating that tracking stock involves
a "vertical" division of rights to the corporate income and assets that it tracks).
4. Sheffield & St. Clair, supra note 1, at 957 (explaining the advantages of tracking
stock in particular business scenarios).
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of corporate interests, however, several questions arise as to whether it
will be subject to various corporate tax provisions.'
The Treasury Department (Treasury) has not yet addressed the tax im-
plications associated with the use of tracking stock.6 While the lack of
authoritative guidance has not prevented some businesses from using this
equity device,7 it certainly has discouraged some risk-sensitive corporate
planners from using tracking stock to its fullest potential.8 Through its
inaction, the government may be indirectly impeding the legitimate use of
this creative addition to the corporate equity lexicon. Furthermore, any
eventual government action is likely to impact transactions that have al-
ready occurred or are currently being contemplated.
For tax purposes, it is important to determine whether tracking stock
will be treated as stock of the issuing parent corporation. For example,
Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 1032(a) provides that a corpora-
tion does not recognize gain or loss on the receipt of property in ex-
change for its stock.9 Furthermore, Code sections 311(a)(1)' ° and
305(a)" allow a corporation to distribute its own stock to its shareholders
without incurring tax liability. If tracking stock is considered to be some-
thing other than the stock of the parent, however, its issuance would be
taxable in each of these situations.12
In determining the immediate tax consequences under these provi-
sions, it is only necessary to determine whether the tracking stock consti-
tutes stock of the parent corporation. If it does not, there is generally no
5. See Report, supra note 3, at 57-64 (addressing questions regarding the federal in-
come tax treatment of tracking stock). The Report was written in response to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) and Treasury Department request for proposals concerning the tax
treatment of tracking stock. Id. at 52.
6. The Treasury Department currently has a "no ruling" policy with respect to track-
ing stock. Rev. Proc. 87-59, 1987-2 C.B. 765 (listing tracking stock as one of the "Areas
Under Extensive Study in Which Rulings or Determination Letters Will Not Be Issued");
Rev. Rul. 93-3, 1993-1 C.B. 209 (listing revenue rulings that have become obsolete and not
including tracking stock).
7. See infra part II.A. discussing General Motors' use of tracking stock and part II.B.
reviewing the USX tracking stock transaction.
8. General Overview and Strategies in Representing Sellers, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR
CORPORATE ACOUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, FINANCINGS, JOINT VENTURES, REORGANIZA-
TIONS, AND RESTRUCTURINGS 1991, at 7, 278-79 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Series
No. 316, 1991).
9. I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1988). Specifically, the Code states that "[n]o gain or loss shall
be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other property in exchange for
stock ... of such corporation." Id.
10. Id. § 311(a)(1).
11. Id. § 305(a).
12. E.g., id. § 311(a)(1). This section requires recognition of gain on a distribution of
property that is "other than an obligation of such corporation". Id. § 311(b)(1)(A).
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need to determine what the instrument actually does represent. When
stock tracks a separately organized subsidiary, however, further questions
are presented. Code section 355, for example, provides that neither the
parent corporation nor a shareholder of the parent recognizes gain or loss
when the parent distributes a controlling interest in the stock of a subsidi-
ary. 3 Thus, if the tracking stock is characterized as stock of the subsidi-
ary, Code section 355 should apply. Conversely, if the tracking stock is
characterized as stock of the parent, 4 the corporation can avoid that sec-
tion's statutory conditions while still achieving a tax-free spin-off.'
This Article addresses the concerns raised by the use of tracking stock
and analyzes two competing conceptual frameworks that have been pro-
posed. This Article concludes that the most logical method of treating
tracking stock for tax purposes is the same approach that is used for state
corporate law purposes-tracking stock should be treated as stock of the
parent corporation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. General Motors Corporation's Use of Tracking Stock
The first well-documented use of tracking stock occurred when Gen-
eral Motors Corporation (GM) acquired Electronic Data Systems (EDS)
in the summer of 1984.16 Through a statutory merger,' 7 EDS sharehold-
ers were given the option of receiving cash for their shares or a combina-
tion of cash, a contingent note, and shares of a newly created class of GM
13. Id. § 355.
14. An additional inquiry might be made as to whether the stock should be treated as
common or preferred. See infra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
15. The actual requirements for a tax-free distribution under Code § 355 are some-
what elaborate. For example, there must be a bona fide business purpose for the transac-
tion. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (as amended in 1992). After the distribution, one or more of
the predistribution shareholders of the parent must continue to own 50% of the value of
both the parent and the subsidiary. Id. § 1.355-2(c)(1). Also, immediately after the distri-
bution, both the parent and the subsidiary must engage in the active conduct of a trade or
business. I.R.C. § 355(b)(1)(B) (1988). Each trade or business existing subsequent to the
distribution must have been actively conducted during the five years immediately preced-
ing the distribution. Id. § 355(b)(2)(B). The distribution must not principally constitute a
device for the distribution of earnings or profits. Id. § 355(a)(1)(B). The parent must con-
trol the subsidiary immediately before the distribution. Id. § 355(a)(1)(A). Finally, the
parent must distribute at least a controlling interest in the subsidiary. Id. § 355 (a)(1)(D).
16. Douglas H. Walter & Paul A. Strasen, Innovative Transactions: General Motors
Class E and Class H Common Stock, 64 TAXEs 365, 365 (1986). Although it is difficult to
determine if GM was actually the first to use tracking stock, at least one source character-
izes the transaction as "novel." Id. at 366; see also Sheffield & St. Clair, supra note 1, at
954 n.1 (establishing that the term "alphabet stock" originated during the GM transaction).
17. Walter & Strasen, supra note 16, at 366.
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stock."8 The new class of stock, denominated as "Class E" stock, was to
receive dividends exclusively from a segregated pool of funds consisting
of the paid-in capital and the net income attributable to the EDS subsidi-
ary. 9 GM used a similar structure when it acquired Hughes Aircraft
Company, resulting in the creation of GM "Class H" stock.20
GM's general counsel set forth two non-tax business reasons for the
company's choice in structuring the transactions.2 1 First, the shareholders
of the acquired companies were accustomed to holding growth stock with
a high price-to-earnings ratio, but the GM stock was trading at a low
price-to-earnings ratio and had shown slow growth immediately preced-
ing the acquisition. EE Second, GM wanted to create an equity vehicle that
would reflect the growth potential of the new subsidiaries without any
dilution, which would occur if the new entrepreneurial acquisitions were
combined with its traditional business. 3
It is likely, however, that tax considerations also played a role in the
decision. In both transactions, GM endeavored to create a market for its
new stock by making a distribution of the new class to the holders of its
regular common stock.24 If the company had elected to issue the subsidi-
ary stock itself, these distributions would not be tax free to the sharehold-
ers. Furthermore, GM may have been unable to file consolidated
returns with its subsidiaries if it had distributed subsidiary stock. 6
Although GM's Class E and Class H tracking stock have unique attrib-
utes, in many ways they resemble traditional parent corporation stock.27
18. Id. Specifically, EDS shareholders could receive $44.00 per share or $35.20 per
share plus a contingent note and two-tenths of a share of the new class of GM stock. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 367 (claiming that GM used the tracking stock transaction again because of
its success in the EDS merger).
21. Id. at 365 (citing Elmer Johnson, Classes of Common Stock Achieve Key Goals,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 17, 1986, at 17).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 367.
25. The shareholder nonrecognition provision of Code § 305 only applies when the
corporation distributes its own stock. I.R.C. § 305(a) (1988). A distribution of subsidiary
stock would generally require the distributees to recognize the value of the stock as gross
income. Id. § 301(b).
26. Only affiliated groups of corporations are eligible to file consolidated returns.
I.R.C. § 1501 (1988). To achieve affiliated group status, the parent corporation must own
80% of the total voting power and 80% of the total value of the subsidiary. Id.
§ 1504(a)(2).
27. These similarities have persuaded some commentators to conclude that the GM
Class E and Class H Stock should be treated as stock of the parent corporation for tax
purposes. Walter & Strasen, supra note 16, at 367. See infra notes 30-32 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the particular similarities).
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For example, the holders of the tracking stock have voting rights similar
to regular GM shareholders and share the liquidation proceeds with
those shareholders in proportion to their relative voting rights.28 More-
over, GM is free to terminate the arrangement any time after December
31, 1994, by causing an exchange of tracking stock shares for regular
shares of GM common stock.29
B. USX Corporation's Tracking Stock Transaction
More recently,30 USX Corporation (USX) used tracking stock to effec-
tively separate its two main lines of business.3 ' USX is composed of two
discernable businesses: steel manufacturing and energy interests.32 By
1990, USX shareholders began looking for ways to divest the less profita-
ble steel operations and to focus on the more dynamic energy business.3
The company, however, did not want to engage in a traditional spin-off
because the transaction would likely be taxable under Code section 355
and would eliminate its ability to use the net operating carryforward
losses generated by the steel manufacturing business.34 In May, 1991, the
shareholders voted to create a new class of stock designed to track the
results of the steel operations.35 The shareholder action split the owner-
ship of the company into two distinct equity interests. 36 The new class of
stock was designated "USX-U.S. Steel Group Common Stock" (Steel
Group Common) and the remaining stock became "USX-Marathon
Group Common Stock" (Marathon Group Common).37
28. Walter & Strasen, supra note 16, at 367.
29. Id.
30. Although several corporations have used tracking stock, the GM and USX trans-
actions are the only examples discussed in detail in this article. One of the most recent
noteworthy proposed transactions involving this equity device was advanced by Kmart
Corporation. See Kmart to Create New Stocks Tied to 4 of Its Units, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5,
1994, at A3. The stockholders of Kmart, however, failed to approve the transaction. Jay
Mathews, Shareholders Block Kmart Stock Issue, WASH. POST, June 4, 1994, at B1.
31. USX Corporation, Proxy Statement and Prospectus, April 10, 1991 [hereinafter
Proxy Statement]; see also Jeffrey D. Conway, The USX Tracking Stock "Spin-Off": A
Case of Split Personality, 69 TAXES 383 (1991); Clare Ansberry, USX Holders Clear Plan
for New Stocks; Talks Under Way to Sell Part of Steel Unit, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991, at A4
[hereinafter Holders Vote].
32. See Conway, supra note 31, at 383.
33. Id. (citing One Year Ago in Corporate Financing Week, CORP. FIN. WEEK, Apr. 15,
1991, at 12).
34. Id.
35. Holders Vote, supra note 31, at A4.
36. See Conway, supra note 31, at 385 (stating that the distinction would give share-
holders "an opportunity to separately evaluate and invest in each").
37. Proxy Statement, supra note 31, at 1.
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While both the GM and USX transactions involved tracking stock,
USX utilized the new equity instrument much more aggressively. Like
GM's tracking stock, the Steel Group Common has general corporate
voting power.31 The voting power of the Steel Group Common, however,
is not fixed; it fluctuates based on the relative market values of the two
classes of stock. 9 Furthermore, the USX plan prohibits the corporation
from using the proceeds from the disposition of one group's assets for the
benefit of the other group without a two-thirds vote by the group whose
assets are involved.4' Thus, while the holders of the individual classes of
USX stock do not directly control the management of their respective
divisions, they do have some influence over management's utilization of
corporate assets. Conversely, the GM transaction gives the board of di-
rectors unfettered discretion to shift assets between groups.
41
The most significant difference between the two situations, however,
concerns liquidation rights. Upon liquidation, there is a pro rata division
of assets among the various classes of GM shareholders;42 however, the
various groups of USX shareholders share liquidation proceeds based on
the relative market capitalizations of their respective divisions.43 Conse-
quently, USX shareholders may enjoy the economic benefit of any appre-
ciation or suffer the economic detriment of any depreciation in the value
of the stock in their respective divisions. This feature makes the two divi-
sions look very much like separate entities."
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
As noted above, Treasury has not yet specifically addressed the tax
consequences relating to the use of tracking stock.45 It may be useful,
however, to examine the treatment of similar investment vehicles in order
to discern the likely approach by the government.
38. The GM plan mandated separate class votes on matters specifically affecting each
class. Walter & Strasen, supra note 16, at 366. In comparison, the USX plan provides that
the steel stock and energy stock generally will vote as a single class. Proxy Statement,
supra note 31, at 3.
39. Proxy Statement, supra note 31, at 3. This scheme was created to require the pur-
chaser to acquire of equivalent holdings in both classes of stock. Id. at 21.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Walter & Strasen, supra note 16, at 366.
42. Id.
43. Proxy Statement, supra, note 31, at 21.
44. Walter & Strasen, supra note 16, at 367-68. It should be noted, however, that this
scenario assumes that a liquidation would leave assets available to the shareholders. Since
a single corporate form is maintained, the assets of both groups are subject to the claims of
the creditors of the corporation.
45. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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A. Series Funds
One possible analogy to tracking stock is the use of a "series fund" in
the context of a regulated investment company.46 This financial structure
is commonly known as a mutual fund. The assets of such an entity consist
of several distinct investments, or "series. '47 In Union Trusteed Funds,
Inc. v. Commissioner," the Tax Court ruled that each series of a series
"fund"49 does not constitute a separate corporate entity." As justifica-
tion for its conclusion, the court noted that Congress failed to specifically
provide for separate corporate treatment of the series funds despite its
presumed knowledge of their existence.' The court further observed
that Treasury had not issued any regulations mandating such treatment. 2
Subsequently, Congress specifically overruled the Tax Court's decision in
Union Trusteed Funds by enacting section 851(h) as part of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986.53
Arguably, because the congressional response to Union Trusteed Funds
was specifically limited to regulated investment companies,54 the Tax
Court's rationale may be applicable to tracking stock. Consequently,
since neither Congress nor Treasury have suggested otherwise, tracking
stock should be treated as ordinary parent corporation stock. The contin-
ued viability of Union Trusteed Funds' reliance on the justification of pre-
sumed congressional knowledge,55 however, is questionable in the
context of tracking stock. Tracking stock is a relatively recent phenom-
ena, and a presumption of knowledge on the part of the national legisla-
ture might be misplaced.
Conversely, section 851(h) may offer insight into Congress' intent rela-
tive to the treatment of instruments similar to series funds. If the enact-
ment of section 851(h) indicates a congressional inclination to treat these
46. See Report supra note 3, at 65-66 (discussing the judicial and legislative treatment
of series funds in the context of a regulated investment company).
47. Id. at 65.
48. 8 T.C. 1133 (1947).
49. A series fund is defined as "a single entity ... with several separate investment
funds." Report, supra note 3, at 65. The entity issues multiple series of stock, with each
series having dividend and liquidation rights corresponding to a specific investment fund.
Id.
50. Union Trusteed Funds, 8 T.C. at 1137.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Code § 851(h)(1) provides: "In the case of a regulated investment company ...
having more than one fund [i.e., a series fund], each fund.., shall be treated as a separate
corporation ...." I.R.C. § 851(h)(1) (1988).
54. The statute applies only to regulated investment companies as defined by the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, as amended. Id. § 851(a).
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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instruments as distinct from their common parent, the conceptual resolu-
tion of the issue should focus on whether the tracking stock is sufficiently
similar to the investment funds of a series fund.
Like the individual series of a series fund, tracking stock represents an
investment in a segregated portion of the corporation's assets.5 6 More-
over, like a mutual fund, tracking stock is not actually an interest in spe-
cific assets because holders of such stock ultimately share the assets of the
entire corporation with the other shareholders.57 Therefore, tracking
stock could be construed as bearing a close resemblance to a series fund.
Instead of tracking the tangible assets of a division, if the tracking stock
tracked certain security investments of a corporation, it would operate
very much like a series fund. Conceptually, therefore, there is support for
the idea that tracking stock is sufficiently similar to a series fund to as-
sume that the legislative policy rationale of Code section 851(h) is an in-
dication of how Congress will ultimately view the tax implications of
tracking stock.
B. Common Stock vs. Preferred Stock
Even if tracking stock is treated as stock of the issuing parent for tax
purposes, it is not clear whether it should be treated as common stock or
preferred stock. This determination is important, for example, in the con-
text of Code section 305.58 That section provides a general rule that gross
income will not include a distribution of stock that is made with respect to
already outstanding stock. 9 The general rule does not apply, however,
"[i]f the distribution ... has the result of-(A) the receipt of preferred
stock by some common shareholders, and (B) the receipt of common
stock by other common shareholders."'  Furthermore, the general rule
will not apply to most distributions of preferred stock.6' Thus, the classi-
fication of tracking stock as either common or preferred is imperative to
this determination.
56. Compare Report, supra note 3, at 54-55 (discussing the correlation between track-
ing stock and the segregated assets of the corporation) with I.R.C. § 851(h)(2) (defining
"fund" as "a segregated portfolio of assets, the beneficial interests in which are owned by
the holders of a class or series of stock of the regulated investment company that is pre-
ferred over all other classes or series in respect of such portfolio of assets").
57. See Walter & Strasen, supra note 16, at 336 (describing the GM Class E
transaction).
58. I.R.C. § 305 (1988).
59. Section 305(a) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this section, gross in-
come does not include the amount of any distribution of the stock of a corporation made
by such corporation to its shareholders with respect to its stock." Id.
60. Id. § 305(b)(3).
61. Id. § 305(b)(4).
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Tracking stock is usually designated by the issuing corporation as a
class of common stock.62 Unlike typical common stock, tracking stock
shares in the earnings of a particular portion of the corporation; if the
particular assets tracked do not show a profit, the tracking stock holders
will not receive a dividend, regardless of the overall performance of the
corporation.63 If the tracked assets do show a profit, however, holders of
the tracking stock have priority over the other corporate shareholders for
these earnings. This preference makes the stock appear more like pre-
ferred stock rather than common stock.
Although the government has not specifically addressed this distinction
in the context of tracking stock, it dealt with a similar issue involving
series stock and the application of Code section 1036. That section pro-
vides that no gain or loss will be recognized if, within the same corpora-
tion, common stock is exchanged for common stock or preferred stock is
exchanged for preferred stock. 64 The government reviewed whether sec-
tion 1036 permitted the tax-free exchange of one particular series stock
for another series stock from the same corporation.65 Interestingly, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruled that series stock was neither com-
mon nor preferred, since both types of stock must share in the earnings of
the entire corporation.66 Arguably, tracking stock should be treated as
neither common nor preferred stock for the same reason.67 Conse-
quently, the exceptions to section 305 tax-free distributions would not ap-
ply to transactions involving tracking stock.
C. Legitimacy of Approach
In 1965, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged the legitimacy of a tax planning device bearing a striking re-
semblance to tracking stock. In Maxwell Hardware Co. v.
Commissioner,68 a corporation issued a special class of stock that was
62. See Conway, supra note 31, at 384 (describing USX transaction); Walter &
Strasen, supra note 16, at 366 (explaining the transaction used by GM).
63. See Sheffield & St. Clair, supra note 1, at 956-57.
64. I.R.C. § 1036(a) (1988).
65. Rev. Rul. 54-65, 1954-1 C.B. 101. Code § 851(h) later superseded this ruling.
I.R.C. § 851(h) (1988). Section 851(h) mandates that each series of an investment com-
pany be treated as a separate corporate entity for tax purposes. Id. § 851(h)(1).
66. Rev. Rul. 54-65, 1954-1 C.B. 101, 103. The Revenue Ruling classified the stock as
"special stock" and held that "an exchange of special stock for special stock of a different
series represents a taxable exchange of property." Id.
67. The ruling, however, only addressed Code § 1036; there is no indication that the
government wished to establish the hermaphrodite nature of series stock for all tax
purposes.
68. 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965).
1115
Catholic University Law Review
designed to mirror the performance of certain real estate holdings.69 This
allowed two investors to establish a real estate division and to use the net
operating loss carryovers to offset the income expected to be generated
by the new division.7" The Ninth Circuit, which was unable to find a legal
reason to prohibit the restriction, upheld the scheme.7'
The relevance of Maxwell Hardware, however, is not its impact on the
law, but rather the insight it provides into how courts might consider
tracking stock arrangements. While the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of
the taxpayers, it also suggested that the Commissioner could have reallo-
cated income under the power conferred by Code section 48272 so as to
prevent tax evasion.73 The Commissioner, however, failed to raise the
applicability of section 482 in its Notice of Deficiency. 74 The court clearly
was not comfortable allowing taxpayers to separate the stockholders' in-
terests among specific assets of a single corporation.75 The judiciary may
take a similar position on tracking stock arrangements and, absent out-
right judicial rejection of the concept, may alert Congress to what may be
perceived as a loophole in the present law.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
At least two commentators have presented rational proposals concern-
ing the tax treatment of tracking stock. First, the New York Bar Associa-
tion Tax Section (New York Bar Association) issued a Report in response
to a study requested by the government.76 Although the Report was pub-
lished in 1987, Treasury has not yet acted on any of its recommendations.
A second commentary, published by Jeffrey T. Sheffield and Barbara M.
69. Id. at 714.
70. Id. The investors sought to use the losses of an existing corporation to offset the
income of a new corporation. Id. at 715. Thus, the stock purchased by the new investors
acted very much like stock of a separate corporation.
71. Id. at 723. Congress subsequently amended Code § 382(a) in response to Maxwell
Hardware. See Report, supra note 3, at 68. Under the current law, the original sharehold-
ers would not be considered to have owned stock for the purpose of determining whether
there had been an "owner shift." Id. Thus, the use of net operating loss carryovers would
have been limited, destroying the purpose for the transaction. See id.
72. Code § 482 provides, in part, that "the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allo-
cate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among [related taxpay-
ers], if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes." I.R.C. § 482 (1988).
73. Maxwell Hardware, 343 F.2d at 720-21.
74. Id. at 721.
75. Id. at 723. The court's discomfort is evident as it explained why the application of
the statute must prevail. "Taxation is peculiarly a matter of statutory law, and in applying
that law to the determination and computation of income and deductions, the Courts do
not make moral judgments." Id.
76. Report, supra note 3.
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St. Clair the following year, reached slightly different conclusions than
the New York Bar Association Report. 7 A description of the two con-
ceptual frameworks is set forth below.
A. Correlation Analysis
The New York Bar Association has suggested that a "correlation analy-
sis" should act as the benchmark for determining the tax treatment of
tracking stock.78 According to the Report, the most significant aspect of
a tracking stock arrangement is the degree to which the corporation has
created a correlation between the value of the stock and the value of the
underlying assets. 79 This correlation is determined by a variety of factors,
including dividend policy, conversion ratio, and the parent corporation's
ability to unilaterally reduce the value of the assets tracked."0
The degree to which the tracking stock fails to reflect the value of the
underlying assets is termed the "economic variance risk."'" Thus, if an
equity interest is viewed along a continuum, with complete economic va-
riance at one end and perfect correlation at the other, tracking stock will
reflect a point on the continuum according to the strength of its relation
to the underlying asset. The closer the tracking stock is to the perfect
correlation pole, the stronger the argument that it should be treated as
other than stock of the parent for tax purposes.8 2
The New York Bar Association provides two justifications for treating
most tracking stock arrangements as stock of the parent for tax purposes.
First, in the typical tracking stock arrangement, shareholders share pro
rata in the assets of the corporation upon liquidation. 3 Second, despite
director assurances, the dividend policy may be subject to change. 84 To-
gether, these factors indicate that the tracking stock is subject to an "eco-
77. Sheffield & St. Clair, supra note 1.
78. Report, supra note 3, at 70.
79. Id. at 58-59.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 64.
82. See id. at 70-71. The New York Bar Association further explained that "[w]here
significant correlation in performance is present, holders of tracking stock will have ac-
quired the functional equivalent of an economic interest in the tracked property, which
interest, by hypothesis, differs greatly from a pro rata equity interest in [the parent corpo-
ration]." Id. (emphasis omitted).
83. Id. at 63.
84. Id.; see, e.g., MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-309(a) (1993) ("If authorized
by its board of directors, a corporation may make distributions to its stockholders .... );
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (1991) ("The directors of every corporation, subject to any
restrictions contained in its certificate of incorporation, may declare and pay dividends
.. . )
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nomic variance risk" that is significant enough to foreclose the possibility
that it represents anything other than stock of the parent.8 5
Using this framework to define the correlation between the tracking
stock and the underlying assets of the corporation, however, requires a
tedious case-by-case analysis of several factors to determine if a particu-
lar issue represents something other than stock of the parent. To over-
come this difficulty, the Report proposes certain objective criteria to
govern the determination.a6 Specifically, if the parent adopts a dividend
policy calling for significant distributions to tracking stock holders that
are not pro rata to the parent's earnings and the tracking stock is either
convertible to regular common stock or redeemable based on relative fair
market values at the time of the conversion or redemption, the stock
should be treated as other than parent corporation stock.87
The Report also provides a conceptualization for tracking stock inter-
ests that are determined to represent something other than stock of the
parent under this analysis. In the New York Bar Association's view,
tracking stock that is not properly characterized as the stock of the parent
corporation should be interpreted as representing an interest in a fic-
tional separate entity. 8 This interpretation divides the ownership of the
entity between the parent corporation and the holders of tracking stock;
the fictional entity is deemed to own the underlying assets.8 9 If the un-
derlying assets represent a separately incorporated subsidiary, the fic-
tional entity would be viewed as owning 100% of that subsidiary.9 Thus,
in determining the parent's ability to file a consolidated return with the
subsidiary, its relative ownership of the fictional entity would have to be
considered.9' If the tracking stock represented greater than a twenty per-
cent interest in the fictional entity, an affiliated group status would not
exist between the corporation and the subsidiary.92 For the purposes of
85. Report, supra note 3, at 64.
86. Id. at 79 (suggesting that a distribution of tracking stock should be eliminated from
consideration for tax-free status under Code § 305(a) when certain objective criteria are
present).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 74-75.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504(a)(2) (1988).
92. I.R.C. § 1501. The Code provides that an affiliated group of corporations may file
consolidated returns. Id.; see supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria
for consideration as an affiliated group).
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other Code provisions, tracking stock would be treated as if it were the
stock of a separate entity.93
In determining the basis of tracking stock deemed to be other than the
stock of the parent, the Report suggests a fictional transaction to corre-
spond to the fictional entity.94 The Report proposes that the parent cor-
poration should be viewed as transferring its interest in the tracked assets
to the new entity in exchange for all of the stock of that entity.95 Thus,
the corporation would have a substituted basis in the fictional stock of the
fictional entity.96 The basis would then be allocated between the dis-
posed fictional shares (which are transformed into real shares of tracking
stock) and the fictional shares retained by the parent (represented by the
fair market value of the tracked assets less the fair market value of the
tracking stock). 97
The Report's fictional transaction scheme is analogous to a situation in
which the parent distributes the underlying assets. In such a case, the
parent corporation would recognize gain,98 and the recipients would rec-
ognize income equal to the fair market value of the property. 99
The distribution analogy is useful in revealing the Report's purpose in
designing this concept. If the tracking stock transaction is actually a
transfer of assets by the parent corporation, then the tracking stock is not
stock at all; it is merely a medium through which the distribution of the
underlying assets is accomplished. At this point the analogy would fail
without the Report's reliance on the fictional separate entity concept be-
cause the holders of tracking stock retain the insolvency risk associated
with all forms of stock ownership.1" The underlying assets, regardless of
whether they are treated as having been distributed for tax purposes, re-
main assets of the parent, subject to the claims of the parent's credi-
93. Report, supra note 3, at 75 (citing Code § 1036 where tracking stock could not be
characterized as stock of the parent corporation for tax-free treatment because it essen-
tially is an interest in a separate entity).
94. Id. at 74-76.
95. Id. at 75.
96. Id. Code § 358 provides for a substituted basis upon such an exchange. I.R.C.
§ 358(a)(1) (1988).
97. Report, supra note 3, at 75.
98. I.R.C. § 311 (1988). The corporation would recognize gain to the extent that the
fair market value of the property distributed by the corporation exceeds the adjusted basis
of the property at the time it was held by the corporation. Id. § 311(b)(1)(B).
99. Id. § 301 (1988). This section provides that a shareholder must recognize as in-
come any amount of property distributed by a corporation that constitutes a dividend. Id.
A dividend is any amount of property that is distributed by a corporation out of its earn-
ings and profits. Id. § 316(a) (1988).
100. Report, supra note 3, at 64.
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tors.10' Thus, ignoring the form of the transaction and treating a
distribution of tracking stock as if it were a distribution of property will
not work. For state corporate law purposes, the tracking stock retains its
character as an equity interest in the parent corporation. The "fictional
entity" concept resolves the dilemma of treating an instrument that is
really the stock of the parent as something other than stock of the parent
for tax purposes.
B. The Benefits/Burdens Theory
Sheffield and St. Clair have developed a slightly different framework to
analyze tracking stock for tax purposes.' 0 2 They contend that the tax
treatment of this equity instrument should be determined by whether it
possesses the "essential attributes" of parent corporation stock.' °3 This
requires an analysis of the benefits and burdens attributable to holders of
the tracking stock.'" The analysis is based on the existence of four rights
normally associated with common stock: dividend rights, liquidation
rights, voting rights, and state law fiduciary rights.' 5
Like traditional parent corporation shares, tracking stock dividend pay-
ments are subordinated to the claims of all parent corporation credi-
tors."° This gives tracking stock holders a downside risk, or burden,
equivalent to the dividend risk taken by all other shareholders. The
equivalency is not apparent, however, with regard to the benefits of shar-
ing in the success of the entire corporation. Typically, dividends are paya-
ble to holders of tracking stock only out of the earnings of the assets
tracked. 1°7 Holders of tracking stock, therefore, will be able to enjoy the
economic success of the tracked assets without being diluted by the over-
all economic performance of the corporation. For this reason, Sheffield
and St. Clair indicate that dividend rights alone do not constitute a suffi-
101. Id. Another feature of the insolvency risk is the possibility that the parent corpo-
ration "might be liquidated, with the value of [the subsidiary's] appreciation after a certain
date being dispersed among all [parent corporation] stockholders." Id.
102. Sheffield & St. Clair, supra note 1.
103. Id. at 955. The commentators actually list seven categories of essential attributes,
including dividends limited to a subset of corporate earnings dividend policy controlled by
the parent corporation's board of directors, shifting corporate earnings between subsets of
assets, liquidation rights, conversion rights, voting rights, and state law rights and limita-
tions. Id. at 955-56.
104. Id. at 958.
105. Id. at 958-60.
106. Id. at 962. Dividends on tracking stock, like stock of the parent corporation, are
payable only after a decision by the board of directors and are subject to certain restric-
tions, such as the state surplus and insolvency laws. Id.
107. Id. at 954, 962.
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cient sharing of economic benefits to warrant treating tracking stock as
stock of the parent." 8
The authors, however, recognize that the vertical division of equity in-
terests in a corporation necessarily creates two classes of tracking
stock.'0 9 Like the tracking stock itself, the value of the remaining stock
of the parent is attributable to a segregated portion of the corporation's
assets." 0 Thus, the typical tracking stock dividend policy limits the cor-
porate earnings available for dividend payments to both the tracking
stock and the remaining parent corporation shares. As a result, the track-
ing shares have no greater potential upside advantage of sharing revenue
than their conventional parent stock counterparts. Therefore, the Shef-
field and St. Clair notion that the dividend policies normally associated
with tracking stock foster unequal sharing of economic benefits is not
necessarily true. The facts and circumstances of each case must be ana-
lyzed to determine if the particular dividend rights meet Sheffield and St.
Clair's economic benefits sharing threshold to warrant treatment of track-
ing stock as stock of the parent.
Sheffield and St. Clair categorically state that tracking stock "is indis-
tinguishable from classic [parent] stock with respect to liquidation
rights.""' This, however, is not necessarily the case. The USX transac-
tion, for example, fixes liquidation rights based on the relative fair market
value of the shares at liquidation." 2 Since this value is based on a partic-
ular portion of the assets within the corporation, tracking stock liquida-
tion rights, at least in this context, differ significantly from the rights of
typical common stockholders, who divide the liquidated proceeds of the
assets of the entire corporation after the creditors are paid.
In this sense, tracking stock resembles preferred stock with a liquida-
tion preference rather than ordinary common stock. Stock with a liquida-
tion preference, however, typically enjoys a preference as to all of the
corporate assets. The corresponding preference held by tracking stock
holders, on the other hand, may be worthless even if other assets of the
corporation yield proceeds that can be distributed to shareholders.
108. Id. at 962. The commentators explain that tracking stock holders could share in
the earnings of the other portions of the parent corporation indirectly. Id. The parent
corporation would have to contribute to or withdraw assets from the subsidiary to allow
tracking share holders to do so. Id. Thus, the connection between the tracking stock hold-
ers and the remainder of the corporate earnings with respect to dividends is weak. Id.
109. Id. at 964 n.58.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 962.
112. Proxy Statement, supra note 31, at 27. Note that the USX transaction took place
subsequent to the publication of the Sheffield and St. Clair article. See supra part II.B. for
a discussion of the USX transaction.
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The results of the USX transaction also challenge the Sheffield and St.
Clair assertion that the voting rights of tracking and parent corporation
stock are identical.' 13 The USX transaction employed state law that al-
lows for differences between classes of stock with regard to voting
rights." 4 For example, the number of votes attributable to the Steel
Group Common fluctuates with market values." 5 Moreover, each of the
two classes of stock has special voting rights with regard to certain trans-
actions that impact their respective assets." 6
It is undisputed, however, that the fiduciary rights of tracking stock
holders, which are fixed under state law, are identical to those of other
stockholders." 7 Unless the tracking stock is considered stock of a sepa-
rate entity for state law purposes,"' holders of tracking stock enjoy the
same rights of duty, loyalty, and care, as well as the same derivative ac-
tion rights, as do other shareholders.
V. ANALYSIS
While Sheffield and St. Clair maintain, based on an analysis of the ben-
efits and burdens of stock ownership, that tracking stock will generally be
viewed as stock of the parent, several of their presumptions can be chal-
lenged by the creative use of such stock, as demonstrated above. In par-
ticular, the USX transaction demonstrates the need to reevaluate the
conceptual frameworks supporting both the correlation and benefits/bur-
dens theories.
Under the correlation analysis, the USX tracking stock should not be
viewed as stock of the parent for tax purposes. The USX dividend policy
provides for dividends payable to holders of Steel Group Common that
are not pro rata as to all of the corporation's earnings." 9 Furthermore,
the redemption provision is based on the market value of the stock at the
113. See Sheffield & St. Clair, supra note 1, at 963 (noting that both types of stock
"have the right to cast votes in the election of [the parent corporation's] Board").
114. Proxy Statement, supra note 31, at 27 (noting that Delaware law requires an ap-
proval of a shareholder majority for each class voting separately to alter or change the
power of such class that would adversely affect them); see also MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE
ANN. § 2-507(a) (1993) (providing that the corporate charter may limit or deny voting
rights to various classes of stock).
115. Proxy Statement, supra note 31, at 26-27.
116. Id. at 27. A vote of 66 2/3% of the outstanding Marathon Group Common is
needed to approve any use of Marathon Group assets or earnings for the benefit of the
Steel Group. Id. A similar framework governed the Steel Group voting procedures. Id.
117. Id.
118. Such a result is unlikely. Regardless of the outcome of the analysis for tax law
purposes, state corporate law looks to the form of the transaction. If tracking stock is
determined to be stock of the parent, state law will treat it as such.
119. Proxy Statement, supra note 31, at 23-24.
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time of redemption. 120 According to the New York Bar Association pro-
posal, therefore, there would be sufficient correlation between Steel
Group Common and the steel group assets to warrant treatment of the
USX tracking stock as stock of a separate entity.
12
The benefits/burdens approach appears to yield the same result. While
the ability to pay dividends to either class of stock is dependent on suffi-
cient capital generated by all of the company's assets, the availability of
dividends in the USX transaction is clearly designed to flow exclusively
from the assets being tracked by the two classes of stock.'22 As noted
above, the liquidation and voting rights of the two types of USX stock are
not equivalent. 23 Therefore, under the Sheffield and St. Clair approach,
the Steel Group Common does not share the same benefits and burdens
as the Marathon Group Common to be considered stock of the same cor-
poration for tax law purposes.
USX would be unable to achieve a tax-free reorganization under either
the New York Bar Association framework or the Sheffield and St. Clair
approach. 24 Both proposals are intended to demonstrate that "typical"
tracking stock arrangements will not be viewed as creating anything other
than stock of the parent. This necessarily means that the USX transac-
tion "crosses the line" with regard to the use of this equity vehicle.
However, as Sheffield and St. Clair acknowledge, it is impossible to
accurately determine the precise correlation between the value of USX's
steel assets and the Steel Group Common's assets.' 25 The value of the
tracking stock may be "contaminated" by the value of the corporation as
a whole. The goal of the New York Bar Association approach, therefore,
is potentially unattainable, because the sufficiency of its objective-factor-
based surrogate is impossible to evaluate. While the model treats the
transaction as having sufficient correlation, there may in fact be a mini-
120. Id. at 24-26.
121. See Report, supra note 3, at 72-73 (describing the correlation analysis).
122. See Proxy Statement, supra note 31, at 22-24. The Proxy Statement mandates that
"[tihe Board intends to declare and pay dividends on the Marathon Stock and the Steel
Stock based on the respective financial condition and results of operations" of each group.
Id. at 22.
123. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
124. Under either approach, the Steel Group Common would be considered something
other than stock of the parent, and the exemption from recognition of gain or loss under
Code § 311(a) would not apply. Sheffield & St. Clair predicted a similarity in the result of
the two approaches when they stated that "[a]ny significant correlation between the eco-
nomic performance of [tracking] stock and the tracked assets should exist only where the
[tracking] stock does not share in the benefits and burdens of [the parent] as a whole."
Sheffield & St. Clair, supra note 1, at 965.
125. Id. at 963.
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mal relationship between the value of the stock and the value of the spec-
ified assets.
Similarly, the result reached by the benefit/burden approach seems to
violate the theoretical foundation of that model. Sheffield and St. Clair
concede that a "guiding principle" of their approach is that the existence
of some economic participation in all of the assets of the parent corpora-
tion is indicative of parent corporation stock. 126 The Steel Group Com-
mon, however, shares a fundamental benefit and burden with the entire
corporation: no dividends will be available to stockholders unless the cor-
poration as a whole generates sufficient capital.' 27 Moreover, the steel
assets are ultimately available to all of the corporation's creditors before
they may be distributed to the holders of Steel Group Common. 128 It
seems anomalous that the application of the benefit/burden theory com-
mands that the stock be treated as something other than stock of the
parent corporation, while the Steel Group Common shares fundamental
economic benefits and burdens with traditional parent stock.
Both proposals undervalue the significance of the insolvency risk asso-
ciated with any stock that is considered parent corporation stock for state
law purposes. A primary purpose of the corporate form is to limit liabil-
ity. The fact that tracking stock does not limit the corporation's liability
to the creditors of the non-tracked portion of the corporation is a compel-
ling reason for treating tracking stock as stock of the parent in all situa-
tions. When investors choose to separately incorporate for non-tax
business reasons, the tax law respects that choice; there is no theoretical
justification for ignoring that principle when investors choose not to sepa-
rately incorporate under state law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The continued availability of tracking stock as a valuable equity device
to corporate planners is contingent upon its proper tax treatment. As
such, it is important for the government to resolve any lingering appre-
hensions by making a final determination.
While the New York Bar Association and Sheffield and St. Clair have
made valuable contributions to the debate concerning how tracking stock
ought to be treated for tax purposes, their conceptual frameworks are
both flawed. The goals sought to be achieved by the former are impossi-
126. Id. at 969.
127. See id. at 962 (stating that dividends are only payable through a declaration of the
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ble to evaluate, and the presumptions of the latter may not be accurate.
A better method is based on fundamental concepts related to the ability
to participate in earnings and the insolvency risk associated with the own-
ership of stock. Because state law dictates that both of these factors be
determined by reference to the parent corporation as a whole, the only
logical approach is to treat tracking stock as it exists under state law-as
stock of the parent. If states wish to reconsider the effect of their corpo-
rate law in light of the use of this new equity vehicle, perhaps by allowing
de facto separate incorporations, tax law should make a similar adjust-
ment. Until that time, however, an irreconcilable clash between state cor-
porate law and corporate tax law should be avoided.

